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NOTES AND COMMENT

ultimate authority that the public welfare will be better served by
inflicting less than the judgment fixed.-(See ex parte Crossmnan, 267
U.S. 87, 120, 121; 45 S.Ct. 332; 69 L. Ed. 527; 38 A.L.R. 131.
Geneally a convict cannot demand a pardon. Yet a person may
contract with the stated under certain condition and on the fulfillment of those requirements the state may grant a pardon on the basis
of the previous contract. There was no contract in this case to that
effect and the state owed the convict no obligation, therefore he could
not say what should be done in this case.
When we come to the commutation of death to imprisonment for life
it is very difficult to see how consent has any more to do with it
than a pardon in full. Supposing that Perovish did not accept the
change, he could not have got himself hanged against the executive
orders. Supposing that he did accept, he could not affect judgment
to be carried out. The consideration that led to the modification had
nothing to do with his will.
The last question: Did the president have power to change the
sentence or in other words was the substituted punishment authorized
by law or did it come within the scope of the words of the constitution, Article 2, sec. 2, which says "the President shall have power
to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States
except in the case of treason?" This section gives the President
power to grant clemency in all cases except treason. And that it is
left within his discretion to impose a lesser penalty for a greater
punishment when the public welfare will be better served by inflicting
a less punishment than fixed by the judgment.
There is no doubt that his power extended to this case as it is
an evidential fact that imprisonment for life is a less penalty than
death. It was treated so under the statute under which Perovish was
tried. Which provides that "the jury may qualify their verdict
(guilty of murder) by adding thereto without capital punishment;
and whenever the jury shall return a verdict qualified as aforesaid
the person convicted shall be sentenced to imprisonment at hard labor
for life criminal code of Alaska, Act of March 3, 1899 c. 429, P. 4;
30 Stat. 1253. See ex parte Wells, I8 How. 307, 15 L. Ed. 42I; ex
Parte Crossman, 267 U.S. 87, 109 45 S.Ct. 332, 69 L. Ed. 527, 38 A.
L.R. 131. The opposite answer would permit the President to decide
that justice requires the diminution of a term of fine without consulting the convict, but would deprive him in most cases of the power and
require him to permit an execution which he has decided ought not
to take place unless the change is agreed to by one who on no sound
principle ought to have any voice in what the law should do for the
welfare of the whole. It is evident that the opinion that the doctrine
of Burdick v. United States does not extend to the present case.
PAUL COLEMAN

Constitutional Law: State Sterilization Law Not Contrary to the
Fourteenth Amendment Giving Due Process and Equal Protection
of the Law.
What is meant by tlf6 provision against cruel and unusual punishment? It is hard to say definitely. Within the pale of due process the
legislature has power to define crimes and fix punishments, great though

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

they may be, or disproportionate to the character of the offense. Going
back to ascertain what was intended by this constitutional provision, the
history of the law tells us of the terrible punishment visited by the
ancient law upon convict criminals. In our days of advanced Christianity and civilization this review is most interesting, yet shocking and
heartrending. After discussing the English Bill of Rights and other
documents,' Justice Brannon says, "In short, the text writers and cases
say that the clause is aimed at those ancient punishments, those horrible,
inhuman, barbarous inflictions." In re O'Shea, ii Cal. App. 575, the
California Court of Appeals for the first district said: "Cruel and
unusual punishments are punishments of a barbarous character and
unknown to the common law. It was such severe, cruel, and unusual
punishments as disgraced the civilization of former ages, and made
one shudder with horror to read them."
In Peter Feilen v. State of Washington, 126 Pac. 75, 70 Wash. 65,
the court said: "Guided by the rule that, in the matter of penalties for
criminal offenses, the courts will not disturb the discretion of the legislature, save in extreme cases, we cannot hold that vasectomy

2

is such

a cruel punishment as cannot be inflicted upon the appellant for the
horrible and brutal crime of statutory rape upon a ten year old girl."
Again, in the case of Whitten v. State, 47 Ga. 297, while dwelling upon
the subject of legislative power in regard to punishments, that court
said: "It would be an interference with matters left by the Constitution to the legislative department of the government for us to undertake to weigh the propriety of this or that penalty fixed by the legislature for specific offenses. The Constitution does not put any limit
upon legislative discretion." On the theory that modern scientific
investigation shows that idiocy, insanity, imbecility, and criminality are
congenital and hereditary, the legislatures of California, Connecticut,3
Indiana, New Jersey, and perhaps some other states, in the exercise of
police power, have enacted laws providing for the sterilization of idiots,
insane, imbeciles, and habitual criminals. The Chicago Evening Post,
some twelve or fifteen years ago, speaking of the Indiana law, mentioned above, says that it is one of the most important reforms before
the people, that "rarely has a thing come with so little fanfare of
trumpets." The Chicago Tribune about that same time, said, "That
the sterilization of defectives and habitual criminals is a measure of
social economy." The first of these operations, which are claimed in
almost every case to be cruel and inhuman, was performed by Dr. H. C.
Sharp, of Indianapolis, in 1899, who was at that time the physician
to the Indiana State Reformatory. He performed these operations
without legislative authority, and through his work the legislature later
' Whitten v. State, "47 Ga. 301; Wyatt's Case, 6 Rand (Va.) 694; Wilkerson v.
Utah, 99 U.S. 130; Wharton, Criminal Law, 7th ed. Par. 3405; Weens v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349.

"According to Dr. George M. Gould's Medical Dictionary, vasectomy consists
of ligating and resecting a small portion of the vas deferens. The vas deferens
is the excretory duct of the testis.
California (Stat. 19o9, p. 1O93, Chap. 720) ; Connecticut (Laws of i9o9, Chap.
209) ; Indiana (Laws of 19o7, Chap. 215) ; Iowa (Laws of 1911, Chap. 129)
New Jersey (Laws of 1911, Chap. 19o).
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enacted its law in regard to sterilization. 4 Dr. Sharp has this to say of
this method of relief to society: "Vasectomy consists of ligating and
resecting a small portion of the 'vas deferens.' This operation is,
indeed, very simple and easy to perform; I do it without administering
an anesthetic, either general or local. It requires about three minutes
to perform the operation, and the subject returns to his work immediately, suffers no inconvenience, and is in no way impaired for his
pursuit of life, liberty, and happiness, but is effectively sterilized."
Dr. William D. Belfield, of Chicago, a pioneer in this work, says it is
less serious than the extraction of a tooth.
The State of Virginia has recently gone a step further in this line
of legislative authority, and has enacted a statuteu which gave the superintendent of the Homes for the Insane the power to order an operation
performed upon inmates who he thought would be able to support
themselves if allowed to go back to their homes, and out into the world
of freedom. This statute called for a certain procedure which gave
the insane party a hearing before a board of directors, with the privilege
of counsel or guardian-ad-litem. In the case of Buck v. Bell, a Supreme Court case, decided May 2, 1927, this statute was challenged and
upheld. It appeared that one Miss Buck, a feeble-minded woman, was
committed to the State Hospital. She was the daughter of an insane
mother, and the mother of an illegitimate feeble-minded child. After a
careful consideration of the condition of the woman, the superintendent
applied to the board of directors for an examination, and this was taken
very thoroughly as well as all other matters of the procedure. The
case was appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeals in Virginia, after
the directors had ordered that the operation of salpingectomy6 be performed upon Miss Buck to make her sterile. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the order of the board of directors, and the inmate appealed,
on the ground that the statute authorizing the judgment is void under
the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution as denying the plaintiff in error due process of law and the equal protection of
the laws. It was decided that the plaintiff had due process because the
rights of the patient were very carefully considered as far as the procedure was concerned and that the procedure authorized by the Virginia statute was valid. However, the real attack was upon the substantive law and not the procedure. To this the court answered that
Miss Buck was the probable potential parent of socially inadequate
offspring, likewise afflicted, and that she might be sexually sterilized
without detriment to her general health and that her welfare and that
of society would be promoted by her sterilization. To quote the opinion
of Justice Holmes, "We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call upon the best citizens for their lives. It would be strange
if it could not call upon those who already sap the strength of the State
for their lesser sacrifices, often not felt to be such by those concerned,
in order to prevent our being swamped with incompetents. It is better
for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring
"Laws of 1907 of Indiana, Chapter 215.
Act of Virginia, Laws of 1924, Chapter 394.
' Gould's Medical Dictionary defines salpingectomy as the excision of the Fallopian tubes.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

for crime, or to let. them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent
those who are manifestly unfit for continuing their kind." The court
points out that the principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is
broad enough to cover the cutting of the Fallopian tubes.7 And they
say that three generations of imbeciles are enough.
Thus we can draw the rule that a state law authorizing sterilization
of mental defectives under careful safeguards are valid under the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and do not
deny due process and equal protection of the law.
There apparently is no such legislation in Wisconsin; at least, the
writer has not been able to find any relative statute or law within the
confines of the Wisconsin Statutes.
AL

WATSON, '28

Fraud: Public Lands; Bona Fide Purchasers.
The late case of Independent Coal and Coke Company v. United
States,' was in the nature of an ancillary suit brought by the government, in aid of a former, for the restoration to the government of
some 5,500 acres of public lands located in Utah, title to which was
procured by a fraud perpetrated upon the land officers of the United
States. The government had, in 1894, granted these lands to the State
of Utah to aid in the establishment of an agricultural college, certain
schools and asylums, and for other purposes.
The lands were later purchased from the state, upon application
and agreements, supported by affidavits that such lands were nonmineral and did not contain deposits of coal. In January, 1907, the
United States brought the first suit against the purchasers of the lands,
and founded its action upon the charge that the procurement of the
lands was had by the employment of fraud and misrepresentation, as
the purchasers had, at the time of the certification, been fully cognizant
of the presence of coal deposits on the lands. The litigation resulted
in a judgment for the government. Milner v. United States2 and
United States v. Sweet.3
A decree was subsequently entered by the district court declaring
that the United States "is the owner" and "entitled to the possession"
of the lands in question, and perpetually enjoining the defendants from
setting up a claim to such premises. This declaration was firmly established by a later affirmation by the Supreme Court.
The resultant holding of the second suit was to the effect that one
acquiring title to public land through the title of a state subsequent to
the certification by the United States to the state takes subject to the
equities of the United States existing at the time of the certification.
Furthermore, intervention by the state, as a party, was
deemed unnecessary, even though an agent of the government; upholding Williams v. United States,4 wherein this court said, "The state was
7

acobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. II; 25 S. Ct. 358; 49 L. Ed. 643; 3 Ann.
Cases 765.
'47 Sup. Ct. Rep. 714, 71 Law. Ed. 758.
1'43 C.C.A. 13, 228 Fed. 431, 439.
245 U.S. 563, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 193.
'138 U.S. 514, 34 Law. Ed. 1026, II Sup. Ct. Rep. 457.

